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Abstract Existing literature has confined university technology transfer almost exclu-
sively to formal mechanisms, like patents, licenses or royalty agreements. Relatively little
is known about informal technology transfer that is based upon interactions between
university scientists and industry personnel. Moreover, most studies are limited to the
United States, where the Bayh-Dole Act has shaped the institutional environment since
1980. In this paper, we provide a comparative study between the United States and Germany
where the equivalent of the Bayh-Dole Act has come into force only in 2002. Based on a
sample of more than 800 university scientists, our results show similar relationships for the
United States and Germany. Faculty quality which is however based on patent applications
rather than publications serves as a major predictor for informal technology transfer
activities. Hence, unless universities change their incentives (e.g., patenting as one criterion
for promotion and tenure) knowledge will continue to flow out the backdoor.
Keywords Informal university technology transfer  Cross-country comparison
JEL Classification J61  O33
1 Introduction
Knowledge produced in the public sector has frequently been shown to be an important
ingredient of economic growth and technological change (Jaffe 1989; Adams 1990; Link
and Siegel 2007). In this respect, patterns of evidence for university technology transfer
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focus on the institutions (e.g., technology transfer offices), the agents involved in tech-
nology commercialization, academic spin-offs, university-industry cooperative research
centers or science parks, and incubators (Bozeman 2000; Aerts et al. 2007; Rothaermel
et al. 2007). Most of the existing research puts emphasis on formal university technology
transfer mechanisms (i.e., those that embody or directly lead to a legal instrument like a
patent, license or royalty agreement (Bozeman 2000; Feldman et al. 2002; Thursby and
Thursby 2002; Siegel and Phan 2005)). Few authors have investigated informal university
technology transfer mechanisms (e.g., Link et al. 2007). Informal technology transfer
focuses primarily on interactions of the agents involved (i.e., on university scientists and
industry personnel) where property rights are of secondary importance.1 Link et al. (2007)
conceive informal technology transfer as a mechanism through which technology
knowledge flows between the agents, for example by technical assistance or consulting.
While formal technology transfer mechanisms frequently aim at transferring a research
result like a patent or a license to use a technology, informal mechanisms do not, and there
is usually no expectation that they will. In this sense, formal technology transfer is seen as
a mechanism to allocate property rights whereas informal technology transfer is much
more about informal communication processes. Examples could be contacts between
academics and industry personnel at conferences, joint publications, academic consulting,
or other informal contacts, talks and meetings.
However, Siegel et al. (2003) and Thursby et al. (2007) find that many university
scientists in the United States do not disclose their inventions to their university although
prescribed by law. And even if university inventions are publicly disclosed some firms will
try to approach scientists and arrange to work with them directly (Hall et al. 2003). Hence,
informal technology transfer seems to be a dominant mode of collaboration. Link et al.
(2007) find that 52% of the scientists they addressed through the Research Value Mapping
Program Survey of Academic Researchers had some kind of working relationship with
industry personnel. Formal and informal technology transfer cannot always be easily
isolated from each other as collaborative research or consulting could comprise patents
being transferred from university to industry. In fact, existing literature suggests that
formal and informal technology transfer may go well together (Siegel et al. 2003; Link
et al. 2007) in that informal contacts improve the quality of a formal relationship or that
formal contracts are accompanied by an informal relation of mutual exchange on tech-
nology-related aspects. Grimpe and Hussinger (2008) find that both channels are com-
plementary (i.e., using one channel of collaboration if the other one is in place has a higher
incremental impact on the innovation performance of firms than using one of the two
channels more intense in isolation). It is therefore not surprising that formal and informal
technology transfer may occur simultaneously (Perkmann and Walsh 2007) and that firms
have an interest to make use of both.
Taking these findings together suggests that university administrators will have an
interest to better understand the determinants of informal technology transfer given their
objective to create revenues for the university. In the United States, the commercialization
of technology developed by university scientists had been spurred by the enactment of the
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. In other countries like Germany, an equivalent to the Bayh-Dole
Act only came into force 20 years later in 2002. The scientists’ right to commercialize
inventions privately before 2002 is still reflected by a rather low number of German
university patents (Czarnitzki et al. 2007, 2008) and few licensing agreements (Grimpe and
1 In the following, we will use the term ‘university scientist’ as shorthand for scientists employed at
universities or other public research institutes.
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Hussinger 2008) compared to the United States. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to shed
light on the effects that institutional differences might have on the choice of scientists to
transfer technology informally. We present comparative findings for Germany by using the
approach of Link et al. (2007). Moreover, we extend their previous findings by focusing on
two neglected factors more explicitly: the scientist’s individual productivity as well as the
research environment in which the informal technology transfer takes place. Using a
comprehensive sample of more than 800 German university scientists, we explore the
determinants of informal technology transfer and derive implications for university
administrators and policy makers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section first provides a
brief review of the literature on university technology transfer. We then describe the results
of the pioneering study on informal technology transfer in the United States (Link et al.
2007) and outline what might be expected in the German context. Section 3 explains our
empirical methods before the subsequent section will show the results. We conclude the
paper with a brief summary statement.
2 Literature background and theoretical considerations
Literature has identified two major sources of motivation for university scientists: the first
has been described as recognition within the academic community. Recognition can most
prominently be achieved through publications, patent applications, presentations, and the
awarding of research grants. As tenure decisions and promotions are primarily a function
of recognition in its various forms, untenured faculty members will have strong incentives
to pursue these objectives. Second, faculty members may also be motivated by the
opportunity to acquire additional resources, resulting either in personal financial gain or in
funding available for a build-up of physical and human capital at the scientist’s institution
(Link et al. 2007). Analyzing the effectiveness of university technology transfer offices
(TTOs) which were created mainly as a consequence of the Bayh-Dole Act assigning the
rights on faculty inventions to the university, Siegel et al. (2003, 2004) find, however, that
these TTOs provide little incentives for faculty involvement. In other words, university
TTOs loose opportunities for technology commercialization due to a perceived unfavor-
able royalty distribution to the scientist. In fact, simply increasing the returns to faculty
members seems to make the commercialization process more effective (Friedman and
Silberman 2003; Lach and Schankerman 2004; Link and Siegel 2005). However, signifi-
cant difficulties in negotiating and transacting with the TTO remain (Link and Siegel 2005)
which suggests that university scientists may have strong incentives to informally transfer
their research results instead of choosing the route through the TTO.
Link et al. (2007) have been the first to shed further light on the decision of academics
to engage in informal technology transfer. Their results for the United States are based on
the Research Value Mapping Program Survey of Academic Researchers for which a
sample of university scientists and engineers with a Ph.D. at the 150 Carnegie Extensive
Doctoral/Research Universities during the time period spring 2004 to spring 2005 was
collected. Link et al. (2007) distinguish between three mechanism through which informal
technology transfer may occur: commercializing technology through direct collaboration
with industry personnel, joint publication with industry personnel, and serving as a for-
mally paid consultant to an industrial firm. They link these choices to a number of variables
depicting faculty characteristics, including gender, tenure/years with tenure, age, and the
percent of time spent on grants-related research. While gender serves as a control variable,
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the tenure variables are intended to measure faculty quality in terms of received recog-
nition and research success. These measures are based on the argument that tenure serves
as a signal and that more credentialed faculty will also be in higher demand by industry
(Murray 2004). Age is included to disentangle the effects from tenure as a signal of faculty
quality and the time necessary to build up relationships with industry. The percent of time
allocated to grants-related research serves as another proxy for human capital as the
awarding of grants involves a review process by an external organization, and only the
most promising grant applications will presumably be likely to pass this hurdle. Finally,
academic disciplines control for different technological and hence transfer opportunities.
Their results show that 52% of the scientists had some kind of working relationship with
industry personnel, including most prominently consulting (18%), joint commercialization
of technology (15.8%), and joint publication activities (14.6%). Regarding their faculty
quality indicators they show that tenured academics are more likely than untenured aca-
demics to engage in all three informal technology transfer activities. Consistent with this
finding, the number of years with tenure as an alternative measure increases the propensity
for informal technology transfer. Moreover, they observe the same effect for the per-
centage of time spent on grants-related research. Regarding the gender, male faculty
members are found to be more likely to transfer technology informally than female faculty
members. Although Link et al. (2007) control for disciplinary effects, they argue that
gender effects might also be explained by disciplinary selection in that women are typically
less represented in disciplines most active in technology transfer. Regarding the scientist’s
age, they find that younger academics are more likely to engage in joint commercialization
of technology. There is no effect on the other two forms of informal technology transfer. In
sum, the results by Link et al. (2007) provide first insights into the decision of academics to
engage in informal technology transfer. There are, however, a number of reasons which
suggest that results on the propensity to engage in informal technology transfer could be
different in different institutional contexts. In the following, we will thus provide argu-
ments that point to the differences between the United States and Germany with a possible
influence on the academic’s choice for engaging in informal technology transfer.
Differences can, first of all, be attributed to the existence of the Bayh-Dole Act in the
United States since 1980. In Germany, the ‘professor’s privilege’ (‘Hochschullehrer-
Privileg’) was in place until 2002. Based on Article 5 of the German constitution, which
focuses on the freedom of science and research, the professor’s privilege entitled aca-
demics in Germany to use their scientific results for private commercialization even if the
underlying research was carried out at and financed by the university or other public
sources (Kilger and Bartenbach 2002). In fact, the professors’ right to commercialize
inventions privately before that year is reflected by a low number of German university
patents (Czarnitzki et al. 2007, 2008). Moreover, university licensing which is receiving
much attention in the literature on industry-science links is used by relatively few German
firms (Grimpe and Hussinger 2008). Instead, consulting and informal collaboration have
been shown to be substantial. Although several years have passed since the abolishment of
the professor’s privilege in Germany, we can expect these patterns to persist, particularly
because most German universities are still in the process to set up an effective technology
transfer infrastructure. As a consequence, university scientists in Germany, and especially
highly credentialed faculty members, should be more likely to engage in informal tech-
nology transfer than their U.S. counterparts.
Second, differences between the United States and Germany could arise from different
work contracts. While U.S. faculty members receive their pay typically only for 9 months
of the year, German academics are paid for 12 months. The missing 3 months could in turn
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motivate U.S. faculty to seek other income opportunities and to engage in informal
technology transfer. Moreover, U.S. faculty might be under higher pressure than their Ger-
man colleagues to acquire research money to support ongoing projects and junior staff.
Third, we may assume that the specific German orientation toward excellence in
engineering plays a role for the informal technology transfer behavior. Several German
universities have a long-standing tradition and reputation in the field of engineering.
Engineering research is organized in large research groups, with multi-million research
funding and close collaboration with industry. Moreover, engineers in Germany are typ-
ically member of the German engineers association (‘VDI—Verein Deutscher Ingenieu-
re’). Both the bonds through their alma mater and the network provided by the engineering
association should therefore facilitate informal technology transfer activities. As a result,
we should be able to observe strong positive effects particularly from scientists in engi-
neering disciplines.
Besides the alleged differences between the United States and Germany, our research
also aims at extending the findings of Link et al. (2007) by focusing more in detail on the
faculty quality dimension as well as on the scientist’s research environment. While the
faculty quality indicators used by Link et al. (2007) are presumably correlated with
individual productivity, they do not account for the different facets of productivity upon
which tenure and grant award decisions are typically based. We have outlined above that
academic prestige serves as a signal to potential commercialization partners in industry.
Prestige can in turn be built up through publications or patents. Recent studies for the
United States and Germany show that publications and university patenting are positively
linked (e.g., Agrawal and Henderson 2002; Stephan et al. 2006; Czarnitzki et al. 2009). As
a consequence, we will include direct measures of the publication and patenting activities
of scientists and relate them to their informal technology transfer behavior. More specif-
ically, we expect positive effects from publications on the decision to jointly publish with
industry personnel and from patents on the informal commercialization of technology.
Regarding consulting, we expect positive effects from both publications and patenting.
Besides research productivity, tenure and the awarding of grants, there is another aspect
of faculty quality that has been neglected so far (i.e., whether the scientist is a research
group leader). Obviously, leading a research group should be associated with some aca-
demic prestige developed through publications or patents. Moreover, being a research
group leader should lead to a multitude of contacts with industry personnel at various
occasions. Assuming that the group leader’s recognition increases with group size, there
should be an incentive to engage in informal technology transfer and acquire research
money to support the group. Effects should be particularly pronounced for the decision to
commercialize technology and to serve as a paid consultant as these forms of technology
transfer could serve as a mechanism to raise funding.
As a final extension to the model by Link et al. (2007) we suggest that the scientist’s
research environment matters for the decision to transfer technology informally. In this
context, Etzkowitz (2003) has put forward the notion of research groups as ‘quasi-firms’ in
entrepreneurial universities. Provided that research funding is awarded on a competitive
basis, research groups will presumably exhibit firm-like qualities. In the following, we will
focus on one aspect of the research environment which is the size of the peer group at the
scientist’s institution. On the one hand, the more people are working on similar topics the
more internal opportunities for collaboration arise. On the other hand, competitive pressure
for research money will also be higher which is why we expect academics to be more likely
to engage in informal technology transfer.
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3 Data and econometric model
The data used in our empirical analysis stem from a survey among German scientists which
was carried out on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The
aim of the survey, which was part of an evaluation project of the 6th European Union
Research Framework Program, was to get an overview of university scientists’ efforts to
acquire research grants from various sources. Data were collected in 2008 using an online
survey instrument. On the one hand, contacting respondents via e-mail involves the risk of
not reaching a considerable number of persons due to outdated or misspelled e-mail
addresses. On the other hand, e-mails have the advantage to be independent from space (i.e.,
the e-mail will reach the scientist although she or he might be away from the home office).
Two major data sources were used for the sampling procedure. In a first step, the population
of scientists employed at German universities was derived from the ‘Hochschullehrerver-
zeichnis’ from the year 2006. The ‘Hochschullehrerverzeichnis’ is a database containing the
names, degrees, and contact information of the academic personnel holding a Ph.D. and
being employed at German universities.2 In a second step, scientists at government-funded
public research institutes were identified via an internet search of the institutes’ websites.
These research institutes belong to one of the four large German science organizations: Max
Planck Society, Fraunhofer Society, Leibniz Association and Helmholtz Association. In
total, 20,519 scientists with available e-mail addresses were identified. For 4,250 scientists,
delivery of the message failed because of a wrong e-mail address. We obtained 2,797
responses, a response rate on the net sample of 17.2% which can be regarded as satisfactory
for such a large-scale online survey. Due to missing values for some variables the actual
number of observations available for analysis is, however, lower.
The measures of informal technology transfer and the explanatory variables are based
on faculty responses. To achieve comparability, we used exactly the same questions as in
the Research Value Mapping Program Survey of Academic Researchers (Link et al. 2007).
For our dependent variables relating to alternative mechanisms of informal technology
transfer, scientists were asked to respond to these statements in the survey:
During the past 12 months:
• I worked directly with industry personnel in an effort to transfer or commercialize
technology or applied research.
• I co-authored a paper with industry personnel that has been published in a journal or
refereed proceedings.
• I served as a formal paid consultant to an industrial firm.
We estimate several probit models and regress the three choices to transfer technology
informally on different sets of explanatory variables. The first set is intended to exactly
replicate the analysis by Link et al. (2007) for Germany, thus including faculty characteristics
like gender (males = 1, 0 otherwise), tenure (tenured = 1, 0 otherwise), age (in logs),3 pre-
eminence of the faculty member, as measured by the percent of time spent on grants-related
research, and dummies for the scientific disciplines (social sciences and humanities, life
sciences, other natural sciences, engineering sciences, with social sciences and humanities
being the reference case). As an alternative specification, we include a scientist’s number of
years with tenure (in logs), leaving tenure and age out of the model due to high correlation.
2 This excludes the so-called ‘universities of applied sciences’ whose major task is teaching and not research.
3 For all variables which enter the regression in logs, a value of 0 was replaced by 0.1 to prevent missing
values due to the log transformation.
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The second set of variables is our extension to the model used by Link et al. (2007). The
survey of German scientists provides more in-depth information about the scientist’s pro-
ductivity and the institutional environment in which the research activities are carried out.
Scientists were asked whether they are leading a research group (leader = 1, 0 otherwise)
and how many publications in refereed journals and patent applications they were able to
achieve in the period from 2002 to 2006 (each entered in logs). To control for the research
environment and, more specifically for the size of the peer group, scientists were asked how
many colleagues they have at their institution working on similar research topics (in logs).
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics (Table 1) show that almost half of the surveyed scientists worked
together with industry personnel in an effort to commercialize technology. Slightly more
than 20% of the scientists exhibit at least one joint publication with industry personnel.
Around 17% of the scientists served as a formally paid consultant to a firm. Regarding the
faculty characteristics we find that the majority of the surveyed scientists are male (86%)
with an average age 49 years. A high share of the scientists in our sample is tenured (83%)
and on average the scientists have been tenured since 12 years. Further, the surveyed
researchers spent about one-third of the time on grants-related research. Regarding the
scientific disciplines, our sample is rather evenly split between the four categories.
If we compare the descriptive statistics for the sample of German scientists with the
descriptive statistics of the sample used by Link et al. (2007) we can observe considerable
differences. Apparently, German scientists are more active in commercializing technology
than their U.S. colleagues but somewhat less active in joint publication and consulting
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Commercialize technology 945 0.438 0.496 0 1
Joint publication 938 0.230 0.421 0 1
Consulting 925 0.172 0.377 0 1
Gender 943 0.856 0.351 0 1
Tenure 926 0.828 0.377 0 1
Percent time spent on grants-related research 880 32.378 22.867 0 100
Age 948 49.283 8.371 28 70
Years with tenure 745 11.913 8.391 1 43
Social sciences and humanities 929 0.212 0.409 0 1
Life sciences 929 0.284 0.451 0 1
Other natural sciences 929 0.302 0.460 0 1
Engineering sciences 929 0.201 0.401 0 1
Research group leader 928 0.706 0.456 0 1
No of publications 948 20.638 26.440 0 200
No of patent applications 948 0.714 1.927 0 24
Size of the peer group at the scientist’s institution 948 30.324 76.077 0 1000
Sample restricted to scientists with non-missing values for at least one informal technology transfer channel
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activities. At the same time the U.S. sample is more balanced regarding the gender of the
scientists compared to the sample of the German scientists which results from gender
stratification. The descriptive statistics for the additional variables which were not avail-
able in the U.S. sample show that about 70% of the scientists in our sample stated that they
were research group leaders at the time when the survey was conducted. The productivity
variables reveal that the surveyed scientists published around 20 articles in refereed
journals within a 5-year period and on average applied for 0.7 patents during the years
2002–2006. Finally the variable that controls for the size of the peer group shows that on
average the size of the peer group at the scientist’s institution is about 30 scientists.
4.2 Probit regressions
Table 2 presents the results of probit regression models. For each of the three dependent
variables four different model specifications are estimated. Models (1) and (2) for each
dependent variable show the results of the basic model following the empirical approach of
Link et al. (2007). In Model (1) we include the tenure dummy and age while the years with
tenure are omitted due to high correlation with age. Model (2) substitutes age by years with
tenure. Models (3) and (4) show the same specification as (1) and (2) but they are extended
by the additional variables on productivity and research environment discussed before.
Regarding gender, Link et al. (2007) find that male academics are more likely to engage
in informal technology transfer, specifically in the commercialization of technology and
consulting activities. We are able to confirm this finding for the German data. It is par-
ticularly pronounced for consulting activities where the coefficient is highly significant.
Moreover, we can largely confirm the positive effects from tenure on the likelihood to
engage in technology commercialization and joint publication. Model (2) however shows
that the number of years with tenure does not have any effect on informal technology
transfer which is in stark contrast to the findings by Link et al. (2007). Similarly, age turns
out to have no effect at all which is in concordance with the findings from the United
States. We can again confirm the U.S. findings regarding the share of time spent on grants-
related research. In both datasets, the effect is positive and significant for all three forms of
informal technology transfer. To sum up, our findings for the German scientists largely
confirm the results obtained by Link et al. (2007). Apart from differences in the descriptive
statistics regarding the actual engagement in the three forms of informal technology
transfer, the relationships between the assumed driving factors are similar, despite the
institutional differences between the United States and Germany.
While in the U.S. study discipline effects were held constant and results weighted by
discipline sampling proportions, the models using the German dataset include dummy
variables to capture discipline effects.4 This enables us to consider disciplinary effects more
explicitly. Generally speaking, all three included disciplines are more likely to engage in
informal technology transfer compared to the reference group of social sciences and
humanities which is anything but surprising. Particularly engineering scientists are very
likely to engage in all three forms of informal technology transfer, suggesting that there are
4 The reason for this is that sampling proportions by field could not be taken into account as—due to the
inclusion of government-funded research institutes—the population of scientists in Germany with regard to
the field is not fully transparent. In Germany, a significant share of the engineering related research activities
are performed by the Fraunhofer institutes in comparison to universities. The same applies to life sciences
research which is to a significant extent performed at Max Planck institutes.
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indeed strong informal ties between academics and industry personnel, for example through
the German engineers association. There is no effect on consulting for other natural scientists.
Turning to the extension of the baseline models, we find several interesting effects.
Apparently, being a research group leader matters considerably for technology commer-
cialization and consulting but not for joint publication. This finding confirms our theo-
retical reasoning that research group leaders have a higher incentive to acquire research
money in order to finance their group. In this light, joint publication activities seem
inappropriate. Moreover, research group leaders are often caught in administrative business
and therefore often do not find the time to conduct research and publish the results. Our
measure for the research environment (i.e., the size of the peer group) turns out to be
marginally positively related to technology commercialization and negatively to consult-
ing. We expected a positive sign throughout due to the argument that research funding is
awarded on a competitive basis and the size of the peer group should positively influence
the level of competition for funds. We may speculate that the negative sign for consulting
hints at a different kind of peer pressure not to engage too intensively in activities that do
not primarily benefit the university or research institute but rather the private remuneration.
Finally, focusing on the research productivity indicators publications and patent
applications we find that the number of publications is not important at all for the decision
to engage in any form of informal technology transfer. Instead, patent applications have a
consistently positive and significant effect. Obviously, scientists succeed in signalling their
quality to industry not by publications which would rather contribute to academic merits
but by patents. Firms seem to acknowledge the practice-oriented work of the scientists that
may be immediately integrated into the firm’s knowledge base. In this respect, our results
are in contrast to previous findings for the biotechnology industry showing that university
‘‘star’’ scientists, measured in terms of publication activity, are attractive partners for firm
scientists to collaborate with (e.g., Zucker and Darby 1996; Zucker et al. 2002). Hence,
this argument seems to hold true only in the specific disciplinary setting of biotechnology
while it disappears when scientists from various disciplines are considered.
Comparing the baseline models (1) and (2) with our extended models (3) and (4) shows
that the positive tenure effect as a proxy for faculty quality observed both in the U.S. and
German data is partly taken over by the patent and research group leader variables. Faculty
quality hence seems to be a multifaceted construct on which the added variables were able
to shed some more light.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to shed light on the effects that institutional differences have
on the choice of scientists to transfer technology informally. Our comparison of results for
the United States and for Germany reveals similar behavior of faculty. Focusing in more
detail on the research productivity of faculty in terms of publications and patents our
results show that particularly university scientists with a track record of patent applications
are an attractive partner for firm scientists in joint informal technology transfer activities.
The lesson learned from our research is simple; faculty, like all economic agents,
respond to incentives and until universities change their incentives (e.g., patenting as one
criterion for promotion and tenure) knowledge will continue to flow out the backdoor.
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